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AYUB KHAN’S BASIC DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL CONTINUITY IN 
CONTEMPORARY PAKISTAN:  
  
 When one thinks of Pakistan and Pakistan’s political system, one tends to 
quickly classify it as a military regime. It is easy to forget that Pakistan has also 
experimented with democracy on occasions since it came into existence in 1947, and 
elements of democracy or democratising tendencies have coexisted with strong 
authoritarian elements within the same political system. It therefore becomes 
important to view the nature of the political system of the country not so much in 
black or white terms, but to focus more on the areas or shades of grey. After all, there 
were military generals like General Ayub Khan who tried to bring some element of 
democracy to Pakistan, popularly known as ‘basic democracy’ in the existing body of 
scholarly literature, and there were also civilian leaders like Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, from 
the Pakistan People’s Party/PPP, who displayed strong authoritarian tendencies during 
his rule. In the words of Lieven, ‘the civilian administration of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 
was in many ways more dictatorial than the military administrations of Generals Ayub 
Khan and Pervez Musharraf’.1 He further argues, that ‘democratic parties when in 
power have used illegal and dictatorial methods against their opponents-sometimes in 
order to suppress ethnic and sectarian violence, and sometimes to try to maintain their 
own power in the face of multiple challenges from political rivals, ethnic separatists 
and the military.’2  It is the aim of this paper to focus on the areas of grey, looking at 
the coexistence of both democracy and authoritarianism within the Pakistani political 
system, although the paper acknowledges that there is more of a tilt towards 
authoritarianism in Pakistan. In doing so, the paper is especially interested in the 
regime of General Ayub Khan, and his idea of Basic Democracies. But before we go 
into the details of the Ayub regime, who was one of the first major military generals 
in the post-independence era, the paper takes a look at the roots of dictatorship within 
the country. This helps in setting the context. Finally, the paper looks at the post 2000 
situation in Pakistan and argues that the current political climate in the country is not 
that different from the times of General Ayub Khan, and is basically a part of the 
same political trajectory.  
 
Roots of Dictatorship:  
 
  General Pervez Musharraf writes in his ‘In the Line of Fire: A Memoir’ that 
‘A brief political history of Pakistan shows how we have failed to create a true 
democracy’.3 There is now a huge body of literature which has looked into the 
reasons as to why Pakistan faced waves of military rule since 1947, the year it was 
created. First of all it has been argued that the Muslim League, which was the political 
platform for South Asian Muslims in pre independence India and also the party that 
paved the way for the Pakistan movement, was highly fragmented and disorganised. 
There were figures such as Mohammad Iqbal and Syed Ahmed Khan who wanted a 
separate homeland for South Asian Muslims. They feared that they would face 
discrimination had they stayed back in a Hindu dominated India. But there were also 
figures such as Maulana Azad who was not in favour of partition, and the creation of 
a separate homeland for South Asian Muslims. Figures such as Azad saw the Pakistan 
movement, and the creation of a separate country as temporary madness. The Muslim 
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League was founded in 1906. Unlike the Hindu community in South Asia, South 
Asian Muslims lacked political organisation. There were disagreements within the 
community and amongst the leaders as to whether or not South Asian Muslims should 
have their separate homeland and if they did, what sort of a political system should 
they have: should it be Islamic or should it be a secular democracy? South Asian 
Muslims also lacked a strong national figure who could bring together the disparate 
sections of Pakistani society. Whilst the Hindus had a figure in Gandhi, South Asian 
Muslims had no such figure, until Jinnah joined the Pakistan movement which was 
much later. What problematized the situation is that although he had joined the 
movement, he died in 1948, shortly after the country came into existence, so there 
was no major leader like him who could lead the country. Even when he was alive, his 
dominant personality allowed no one to participate in methods of governance, and so 
when he died in 1948, there was a major political vacuum. Furthermore, the Muslim 
League leaders were not well socialised into western styles of democracy, and many 
came from a feudal/semi-feudal background. Whilst the Hindu dominated Indian 
National Congress was founded in 1885, and had much more political experience than 
the Muslim League leaders, which was founded in 1906, the Muslim League leaders 
also had no experience of working together collaboratively as a team. Hasan Askari 
Rizvi has captured this situation beautifully and writes,  
 
‘the political leaders in Pakistan in the post Jinnah-Liaquat period did not possess a 
national stature, lacked imagination and were unable to inspire the people, let alone 
deal with difficult political and economic problems. Many had a feudal and semi-
feudal background and were primarily motivated by their personal ambitions and 
parochial considerations….The Muslim League, which served as the vanguard of the 
freedom struggle, utterly failed to transform itself from a nationalist movement into a 
national party which could serve  as an effective political machine for aggregating 
diverse interests and identities into a plural and participatory national framework…As 
the political forces fragmented and the political institutions declined, the bureaucratic 
elite gained the upper hand and dominated policy making. The appointment of 
Ghulam Mohammad, a former bureaucrat belonging to the Indian Audit and Accounts 
Service, as Governor General in October, 1951, who was succeeded by another 
bureaucrat-cum-military man, Iskander Mirza, in August 1955, set the stage for the 
ascendency of the bureaucracy, bolstered by the military from the background.’4  
 
Thus, it could be argued that the more authoritarian elements in Pakistan or those who 
were in favour of a military dictatorship found these conditions favourable to 
consolidate their position, and took full advantage of the fact that South Asian 
Muslims lacked political organisation. In other words, had the Muslim community in 
the subcontinent been better organised in the years before and after partition in 1947, 
it would have been harder for the military dictatorship to take root.  
 
 There are of course other reasons as to why Pakistan faced waves of military 
rule and struggled with democracy. Since Pakistan came into existence in 1947, it has 
been constantly at war with neighbouring India over the disputed province of 
Kashmir, and the military generals have always argued that till this problem gets 
resolved, democracy cannot be introduced in Pakistan. Pakistan has always perceived 
India as formidable threat, and its foreign policy orientation and its defence policy 
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‘are geared towards this single dominant factor’.5  Not only does Pakistan face threats 
from India from the east over the on-going Kashmir problem, but it also faces threats 
in the west from Afghanistan with regards to the spread of the Taliban insurgency 
(and Islamist groups in general) across the FATA/Federally administered Tribal areas. 
In addition to these external threats from both the east and the west, Pakistan has 
faced and still faces numerous internal challenges. For instance, Pakistan has had to 
deal with secessionist movements in the more peripheral parts of the country 
especially in Sindh, Baluchistan and North Western Frontier Provinces. Out of all the 
secessionist movements that have taken place in Pakistan, the one that created major 
turmoil and the one that destabilised the country was the secession of former East 
Pakistan, which came to be known as Bangladesh in 1971. Needless to say, all of 
these separatist groups have most certainly put a lot of pressure on the political elite in 
Pakistan, thereby strengthening the role of the military and delaying the process of 
democratization. The military has always argued that it needs to stay in power to deal 
with all these numerous internal and external security challenges. This has in turn 
pushed the civilian leaders away from the centre stage of Pakistani domestic politics. 
In other words, Pakistan has almost always been in a situation of emergency since its 
birth in 1947. It has often been described as a ‘warrior state’6, since it has been in a 
state of perpetual war with itself.  
 
In Pakistan, there have been no powerful organisations that can legitimately 
speak on behalf of large sections of the people, which could then pressurise the 
political system to become more democratic.
7
 Furthermore, Pakistan has a weak and 
ethnically divided civil society that has been unable to act as a force for democracy.
8
 
The civilian leaders by and large seem weaker in comparison to their military 
counterparts, and often depend on the military for support and assistance especially in 
matters relating to Pakistani governance. This gives the military a strong image, and 
the more the civilian government depends on the military, the latter’s prestige is 
raised. The military has traditionally had a strong powerful image and is often 
associated with the martial traditions of Punjab and also with the concepts of ‘sayeed’, 
which means martyr, ‘jihad’ or holy war and ‘gazi’, which refers to valour and 
courage. Traditionally, they were seen as the men who shielded the Empire, when the 
British ruled the subcontinent. Furthermore, the civilian leaders have not really used 
the interludes or the periods in between military rule to establish a strong civilian 
government
9
. Since Pakistan came into existence, it’s not as if all the prominent 
military leaders have been in power continuously. ‘Pakistan has undergone long spells 
of military dictatorship, interspersed with periods of democratic rule’.10 There have 
been gaps in between military rule. For instance Auyb Khan was in power from 1958-
69, Yayha Khan was in power from 1970-71, Zia ul Haque was in power from 1977-
88, and Musharraf has been in power from the late nineties till 2008. Now the civilian 
leaders did not use these gaps to create a strong civilian government. They made no 
attempt to consolidate civilian rule in Pakistan. There seems to have been a lack of 
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interest amongst them, a sense of apathy.  The dismal state of the judiciary has also 
allowed the more authoritarian elements of the country to flex their muscles, and in 
turn, tighten their grip over the polity. For the smooth functioning of a democracy, 
one of the chief requirements is to have a strong and independent judiciary, but this 
has never been the case in Pakistan. Other factors which have prevented the rise of 
democracy in Pakistan include the role played by the United States of America 
throughout the Cold War period. The security establishment in Washington has 
always felt that to further American interests in the region, it is much easier to deal 
with one man than to deal with an entire population of a country or the electorate. 
Thus, the Americans have always backed the military generals in their fight against 
Communism during the Cold War phase and have tried to do the same post 2000 in 
their fight against global terrorism. The United States has not supported civilian 
governments in Pakistan in a similar way. Thus, the support which the Pakistani 
generals have received from Washington has allowed them to stay in power for 
extended periods of time.  
 
 Well known historian on South Asian affairs, Ayesha Jalal has argued that one 
reason why Pakistan struggled with democracy is because it lacked the infrastructure 
which a country needs for the smooth functioning of a democracy. Jalal argues that 
the central state apparatus created by the British during colonial times fell on the 
Indian side, which allowed the Indian leaders in the post-independence period to use 
as a platform to take off with democracy
11
. In other words, the courts, the universities, 
the centres of administration all fell on the Indian side. The Pakistani side did not get 
the same sort of inheritances, which India got, and hence it has had to start from 
scratch, thereby delaying its process of democratisation. Building on Jalal’s argument, 
Mukherjee argues that not only did India inherit the central state apparatus left by the 
British; India also got the better geographical parts of the subcontinent, which helped 
in the democratisation process
12
. For instance, after partition, in 1947, India received 
the fertile Indo Gang-etic Plain in the north which is very suitable for food crop 
cultivation and the Deccan in the south, which is well suited for cash crop cultivation 
like cotton. This obviously helped India’s economy, and as the economy did well and 
as India industrialised, a rising middle class or intelligentsia, came into existence, who 
are generally the movers and shakers of change. The middle class intelligentsia which 
has high purchasing capacity also has access to tertiary education, and as we know 
education creates awareness. Out of this sense of awareness, the middle class tends to 
question old fashioned authoritarian style governments which tend to exclude people 
from the decision making process. Thus, the rising middle class that came into 
existence as a result of India’s flourishing economy, democratic forces got 
strengthened in the Indian context. In contrast, Pakistan inherited the worst 
geographical parts of the subcontinent. Other than the Punjab area of Pakistan, large 
parts of Pakistan are mountainous or a desert, which is obviously not well suited for 
agricultural food crop cultivation or cash crop cultivation. As a result of this, the 
economy faltered, and there was no real rising middle class in Pakistan, which could 
have questioned the policies of the military generals. In other words, the harsh 
geography which Pakistan inherited has had an adverse impact on its economy, which 
in turn did not allow an intelligentsia class to grow, the way it did it neighbouring 
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India. The military generals in Pakistan took advantage of this situation, thus 
strengthening the roots of dictatorship. Now that we have set the context, let us take a 
look at the regime of Ayub Khan and his concept of ‘basic democracy’.  
 
Ayub Khan and Basic Democracy:  
 
 Although Pakistan has struggled with democracy, it has intermittently allowed 
for democratic elections and civilian rule. The Pakistan Army has played an important 
role in the constitutional development of the country.
13
 It should be noted though that 
even when civilian governments have been in charge, they were not fully in control of 
the key levers of state power since the military continued to control the main domains 
of the economy such as national security.
14
 That said, democracy has been introduced 
in the past in Pakistan on a temporary basis, and hence some scholars like Michael 
Hoffman talk about the concept of ‘temporary democracy.’15 
 
The first major experiment with a restricted form of democracy in Pakistan 
was during the time of Ayub Khan, 1958-1969.  His military regime promulgated a 
system called, ‘Basic Democracy’. Elections were held in January, 1960 for ‘Basic 
Democracy Councils’ with 80, 000 members.16 ‘The different layers of this system 
consisted of divisional, district, municipal, towns and war councils, representing the 
different sections and administrative structures of the country.’17 These councils 
would then elect the president. In such an election in February, 1960, Ayub won by a 
vote of 95.6%. From 1960 till the early half of 1962, representatives of the council 
organised, interacted with officials, and advanced plans for economic growth and 
development. One reason why an overwhelming majority supported the referendum in 
1960 establishing a form of controlled democracy called ‘Basic Democracy’ is 
because there was a general dislike for politicians, and it was widely believed that the 
army was a strong force that would be able to provide Pakistan with an element of 
both political and economic stability. The Pakistani people welcomed the military 
coup since they were exhausted with the disputes that went on amongst the 
politicians.
18
 T.V.Paul writes, ‘Ayub Khan’s Basic Democracy system was a cunning 
model designed to legitimize military control while at the same time providing the 
illusion of public participation’.19  
 
Ayub Khan, along with his supporters from Washington and with local 
officials tried to devise civilian institutional foundations for his regime that took the 
form of a so called, ‘basic democracy’, which became the basis of the 1962 
constitution, upon which the Ayub regime based itself.
20
 ‘The new constitutional 
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system called basic democracy provided for indirect election of the president and 
members of the national and provincial assemblies by basic democrats, who were 
members of local councils in villages and towns.
21
 The whole structure was founded 
on a hierarchy of local councils whose work was very closely intertwined with that of 
the bureaucracy at the local level. By virtue of that, the bureaucracy and the state were 
directly linked with local level power holders, who benefitted hugely from state 
patronage, bypassing and isolating political leadership at senior levels.
22
 It was a 
system that was ideally suited to bureaucratic control and manipulation, while at the 
same time allowing for elections at the local levels, which was dominated by 
landowners, thus conferring a semblance of legitimacy on the government.
23
 The 
whole system was very strongly associated with corruption and it greatly strengthened 
the power of the oppressive landlords in the country side. The system was universally 
hated due to its oppressive nature, and in the movement that eventually brought down 




The military has always tampered with the constitution to introduce what it 
defines as democracy that is suitable for Pakistan.
25
 Thus the military has tailored a 
Constitution to secure its interests as well as to introduce its own versions of 
democracy. Ayub, therefore, once described the 1962 Constitution as one which was a 
combination of democracy and discipline, which was needed in the context of the 
anarchical power struggle that preceded Ayub’s take over. He introduced various 
measures to supposedly cleanse the system of corrupt politicians, and was of the 
opinion that parliamentary democracy would not suit Pakistan because of its high 
level of illiteracy. Hence what would work in Pakistan according to him was a limited 
form of democracy, which came to be known as Basic Democracy. ‘Ayub kept the 
Army in the barracks and ruled through the civil services, structurally homogeneous 
to the British viceroy during the colonial era’.26     
 
Basic democracies was not essentially a new idea as far as South Asian 
politics was concerned, and it was really the formalization of a structure of local 
political power which had long existed in the Punjab in the village council of five 
elders (panchayat) and in Bengal in the union boards.
27
 The convergence of Bengali 
and Punjabi antecedents was symbolized by the first announcement of Basic 
Democracies made by Ayub Khan in September, 1959, in which a new term, ‘union 
panchayats’, was used.28 At the Governors’ Conference in Dhaka on the second of 
September, 1959, this was changed to ‘union council’ and the new term was later used 
in the Basic Democracies Law. Using the union councils and Panchayat as a 
substructure, Basic Democracies also incorporated the traditions of the local self-
government which had developed in India at levels of the village, district and 
municipalities. ‘The innovation in Basic Democracies is their use as an integrated 
electoral mechanism at all levels of government through the province, by which 
members at each level are selected from those at the lower level. Other characteristics 
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such as fiscal power, defined authority and nominated elected membership are found 
in local bodies as they had developed on the subcontinent.’29 Basic Democracies was 
meant to be a part of the government’s decision to reform and bring about change in 
Pakistan. Many other projected reforms in law, agricultural development, police, 
application of marriage law, and other areas of life were based on the delegation of 
powers to the union councils. They constituted the mechanism by which legislators 
and the presidents were elected. Ayub, in his September 1959 announcement, had 
mentioned that all the changes and reforms which had been introduced or at least 
thought about in the agrarian, educational, local and economic sectors were designed 
to prepare the base on which an upward pyramid of a sound political system could be 
developed.
30
 Ayub on several occasions stated that the system of democracy that was 
to emerge in Pakistan should develop from the smallest units of society, and that 
representatives must be elected from small primary social groups, and that elected 
assemblies should participate actively in carrying out developmental schemes. The 
mechanism that was created to carry out these aspirations involved four tiers of 
councils. In this connection, mention maybe made of   the union (one or several 
villages), tehsil or thana (groups of villages), district (groups of tehsils), and finally 
the division (groups of districts). In relation to the four tier hierarchical structure 
associated with Ayub’s Basic Democracies plan, Mohammed Waseem writes, ‘80, 
000 basic democrats were elected in both the wings (referring to both former East 
Pakistan and West Pakistan) on the basis of direct adult franchise. Members at each 
tier were elected out of those at the lower level. Through this ingenious method the 
regime tried to establish an institutional base for itself at the mass level. It had great 
hopes that the upper tiers of the Basic Democracies would provide leadership for the 
local population.’31     
 
Thus, the institutional framework of the Basic Democracy plan rested on a 
hierarchical order. Right at the bottom, at the primary level, were the union councils 
which comprised of several villages thereby making up one basic unit. The union 
councillor (Basic Democrat) represented about a thousand to fifteen hundred voters.
32
 
The secondary stratum constituted the tehsil councils, which were made up of several 
union councils. At the tertiary level, were the district councils, which were made up of 
several tehsil councils and the final level was the divisional council, which in turn 
composed of several district councils. The chairman of each council was 
automatically a member of the next higher council. The total number of Basic 
Democrats was not more than 80, 000. Half of them were from former East Pakistan, 
or present day Bangladesh, and ‘the whole system was intended to act as an electoral 
college to elect the president and members of the National and Provincial 
Assemblies.’33 
 
 In order to maintain their power, military generals have had to rely on 
parliamentary coalitions made up of some of the most opportunist politicians in 
Pakistan. In 1962, Ayub created the Convention Muslim League as a political party 
‘to prop up his rule in the face of political pressure that he could not crush through 
repression. Ayub’s ‘party’ was an alliance of independent local notables and bosses, 
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and in no sense either a mass movement or a modern political party staffed by full 
time professional officials and volunteers.’34 The Convention Muslim League was 
part of a pattern whereby would-be reformist administrations have to depend on 
traditional and strongly anti-reformist power holders to maintain their rule.
35
 This has 
always inevitably involved turning a blind eye to their corruption, and rewarding them 
with patronage which has in turn undermined and eroded political transparency, good 
and fair governance, and the state budget.   
 
 Democracy as a concept is not just about political democracy and free and fair 
elections. It is a multifaceted term and there are different facets as far as this term, 
‘democracy’ is concerned. In this connection mention maybe made of the concepts of 
economic democracy and social democracy. Ayub’s rule is often associated with 
economic growth and development. Despite the fact that Ayub’s rule witnessed strong 
economic growth and development, this did not have a trickle-down effect and thus 
wealth was concentrated in very few hands. The regime’s development agenda only 
exacerbated existing inequalities. The benefits of this growth did not reach the 
masses. By the late nineteen sixties, there was strong resistance to Ayub’s regime.  
Ex-Pakistani President Musharraf writes, ‘The main themes of the discontent were 
economic disparities between eastern and western Pakistan, the concentration of 
wealth in twenty two families, an acute sense of deprivation and alienation in East 
Pakistan, and a general political suffocation of the public.’36   
 
 The situation in Pakistan is quite complex and the civilian leadership and the 
military establishment should not be seen as water tight compartments. The military 
takeover in Pakistan was brought about by men who were already actively taking part 
in the existing political system, ‘and who had institutional bases of power within that 
system. Long before the coup, the military had been working as a silent partner in the 
civil-military bureaucratic coalition that held the key decision-making power in the 
country’.37 The civil military bureaucracy has often looked down on politicians who 
were seen as obstacles to economic growth and development. One of the reasons why 
the military bureaucracy developed strong ties with the civil bureaucracy was because 
their views with regard to Pakistan’s problems and solutions were quite similar. Both 
of them gave a lot of importance and priority to state building, government building 
tasks and had faith in a policy of centralization.
38
 The first cabinet of the Ayub regime 
did not include any prominent political figures, nor did the subsequent cabinets during 
the martial law phase from 1958 till 1962. With the introduction of the 1962 
Constitution, the regime was obliged to come to terms with the political elite and to 
include politicians in the cabinet. But even after 1962, none of the important cabinet 
portfolios whether in the areas of defence, planning, finance were given to politicians. 
‘Ayub’s key advisers throughout his rule remained non-political: Manzur Qadir, 
Shoaib Q.A. Shahab, Altaf Gauhar, and Fida Hasan’.39 Even when the regime allowed 
the renewal of limited political activity, it formed an alliance with the old non-
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vernacular ‘national’ political elite. ‘The vernacular political elite was still anathema 
to the regime’.40   
 
One of the major problems with Ayub’s regime was that the political leaders 
who had popular support and strong organizational backing were not allowed a share 
in the power, whilst those who had a share in the decision making process were either 
without a party or were without mass support and hence not very effective vis-à-vis 
the bureaucracy and the commercial elite. The other group that lost some of its power 
was the landed aristocracy or the feudal elements i.e. the zamindari class. This was in 
some ways a positive development, but not positive enough to allow democratic 
elements to take root in Pakistan. ‘The first Basic Democracies election of 1959 
indicated the declining influence of landlords in rural politics’.41 The declining 
influence of landed magnates and the aristocracy was also visible in the 1962 national 
and provincial assemblies. However, there were glaring contradictions in the whole 
process because as the Ayub regime politicized itself, it began to fall back on the 
support of the landlords to some extent. This was partly because the regime had 
entered into an alliance with the old national political elite whose major source of 
support was the landed aristocracy. 
 
 In relation to Pakistan’s political system under Ayub Khan, Mohammed 
Waseem writes, ‘The bureaucratic polity of Pakistan under Ayub presented an 
involuted form of paternalistic rule. Its involution came from applying new sources of 
legitimacy to the maintenance of the political order of a previous era. The state 
increasingly eschewed the language of public participation in the name of 
nationalism.’42 National unity was emphasised over local differentiation in popular 
opinion. For instance, the Ayub administration established the Bureau of National 
Reconstruction to bring together the disparate linguistic, ethnic, racial, sectarian and 
social groups together as a cohesive nation. The regime’s system of keeping police 
spies and allocating funds for ‘secret services’ made the then political climate 
increasingly oppressive. Mohammed Waseem further argues that, ‘in the 
constitutional context, this cult of unity was conceptually embedded in the need for a 
strong centre and a very strong chief executive, representing the focal point of 
authority’.43 Such concentration of power was combined with a patriarchal vision to 
produce a closed system of rule without any role for the public at large.   
 
Agreeing with Mohammed Waseem, Asaf Hussain, also follows a similar line 
of argument. Hussain argues that Ayub Khan was very much aware of the recalcitrant 
sections of Pakistani society when he formed his military government and was very 
much aware of the destructive internal political forces in Pakistan which could have a 
destabilising impact on Pakistan’s domestic politics. Thus, his main objective was to 
free the country from these recalcitrant, centrifugal forces that posed a threat to the 
national and territorial integrity of Pakistan.
44
 As the first power holder of a military 
regime, he had to prove to other elite groups that he had more power and authority 
than them. Thus, he enacted the Electoral Bodies Disqualification Order/EBDO to get 
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rid of all forms of resistance and opposition.
45
 Those who suffered the most under the 
Electoral Bodies Disqualification Order were the professional elite from former East 
Pakistan, what is now Bangladesh. To a lesser extent, the land owning elite also 
suffered.    
 
In the final analysis, scholars such as T.V.Paul have criticised Ayub’s Khan 
model of Basic Democracy. Paul writes, ‘it was neither basic nor democratic, because 
it simply did not follow the key principles of democratic rule-the freedom to contest 
elections by independent political parties. It was a top-down model designed by the 
military and its chief so that real democratic forces would not emerge as a challenge 
to the garrison state.’46 
 
 
The Current Situation in Pakistan:  
 
 The post 2000 situation in Pakistan is not very different from the times of 
Ayub Khan. Since the army has been in power for decades ever since Pakistan came 
into existence, elements of the military still have an entrenched position in politics, 
economics, the corporate sector, education and communications in the post 2000 
phase. It may seem that democratic groups have come to the political forefront of 
Pakistan’s domestic politics, but the real power still by and large lies with the 
military. Ex-army generals have often been appointed in senior civilian posts to run 
the civilian administration. In present day Pakistan, although the army does not rule 
directly, it continues to have the real power and it exercises its authority from the 
margins or from ‘behind the scenes’47. This is not a direct take-over. It is indirect rule 
or soft intervention. The military has thus ‘cast long shadows over civilian politics, 
directly ruling the state for more than half of Pakistan’s time as an independent state 
and indirectly exerting its political influence for the rest.’48 Real power lies in the 
hands of not just the army but also with the Pakistani intelligence services like the 
ISI/Inter-Services Intelligence which has strong links with the army. The relationship 
between the civilian government and the military is often strained, and most civilian 
leaders (including the current Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif) are seen as 
puppets in the hands of the military.   
 
‘The military has consolidated near hegemony over key domestic and foreign 
policies and few civilians dare to challenge its prerogatives.’49 Since the civilian 
leaders have often depended on the military for support during times of political crisis 
and emergency, this has gone a long way in enhancing the prestige and power of the 
military. It should also be noted that the civilian leaders have not really been that 
different from their military counterparts. For instance, ‘civilian politicians, as much 
as military leaders, have used Pakistan’s state machinery to mobilise voters.’50  
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To prove the point that this paper made earlier at the outset that Pakistan’s 
political system is more grey and not so much black or white, this gets best captured 
in the words of ex-military general Pervez Musharraf, when he openly expresses his 
sympathy for democracy: 
 
 ‘I ardently believe that no country can progress without democracy, but 
democracy has to be tailored in accordance with each nation’s peculiar environment. 
Only then can it be a functioning democracy that truly empowers the people and 
produces governments to address their needs. If it does not function, then it merely 
creates a façade without spirit or substance….Sadly, a functioning democracy is 
exactly what has eluded Pakistan ever since its birth on August 14, 1947. This lack 
lies at the root of most of our ills. The problem is that while most of us know that the 
Greek word demos means ‘the people’, hardly anyone takes notice of the other vital 
Greek word, kratein, ‘to rule’. Thus ‘people’s rule’ or ‘rule by the people’, which is 
the spirit of democracy, is entirely forgotten. What we in Pakistan have consciously 
constructed instead is rule by a small elite-never democratic, often autocratic, usually 
plutocratic, and lately kleptocratic-all working with a tribal-feudal mindset, ‘in the 
name of the people’ with democratic camouflage. This small elite comprises feudal 
barons, tribal warlords, and politicians of all hues. In Pakistan we inherited a feudal, 
patriarchal society. The population is divided into vertical compartments of provinces, 
tribes, clans, castes and sub-castes. People generally do not vote across these 
compartments or across their tribe, caste or clan boundaries. Elections therefore 
involve shifting coalitions of different clans or tribes, negotiated by tribal or clan 
leaders, rather than appeals to independent voters. The system lends itself to 
incompetence and corruption, leading to poor governance. It creates the illusion of 
democracy because we do have elections; but we forget that elections are but a tool of 
democracy, not an end in themselves.’51    
 
       
 The above comments made by General Musharraf also shows very clearly that 
Pakistan’s political trajectory is part of the same continuum that started since Ayub’s 
time and that there is no real break with past politics. It is clear that there are strong 
elements of continuity between Ayub’s time and Musharraf’s time, especially when 
Musharraf talks about elections in the above passage, and how the Pakistan political 
system creates an ‘illusion of democracy’, which is exactly what we saw with Ayub’s 
so called Basic Democracy.  
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